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??????????na pobre y oscura republiquita, 
??????????????????????????????????????? 
José Batlle y Ordóñez in El Día 
 
Introduction 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. 
Consequently, constitutional reforms are endogenous to the will of significant stakeholders at 
the moment of approval depending on the political-institutional and international context in 
which they transpire. Simultaneously, as an independent variable and across time, reforms 
vary in terms of the effects and externalities they produce and the ratchet effects (the 
irreversibility of enacted reform measures) they create (Pierson 2004). 
???????? ????????? ?? ????? ??????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ?????????. By 
almost any criteria, the country has been an institutionalized liberal democracy for a 
significant part of the 20th century, with political conflict and change following 
institutionalized and democratic procedures. Therefore, recent constitution-making has not 
been advocated or sought as a vehicle for ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
other Latin American cases, particularly in the Andes). However, in spite of being the Latin 
American country with more years of democratic experience since the turn of the 20th 
century, no constitutional regime in Uruguay has survived more than 18 years without 
suffering significant changes. In particular, the country has seen continuous turnover 
regarding electoral rules and the structure of the executive branch.  
During the 20th century, these reforms have been usually negotiated and put forth by 
coalitions of different political fractions benefiting from a contingent convergence of their 
                                                                                                                                                        
 A previous version of this paper was delivered at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, August 31 - September 3; Philadelphia, PA. This research was financed by ???????????????????
#1060749. 
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(electoral) short-term interests.1 ????????? ??????????????? ?????????????? ???? ???????????
introduced to isolate the Uruguayan party-system (bipartidist, fractionalized,2 and with a long 
tradition of co-participation of both parties in government) from socioeconomic change, 
enabling continuity and stability through electoral and constitutional reforms.3  
Against this backdrop, the constitutional reform of 1996 is consistent with the long-term 
trajectory of the country. This reform pursued an explicit objective for both traditional parties: 
to prevent Frente Amplio (the leftist opposition to traditional parties) from arriving into 
presidential office, at a time when the traditional electoral formulas that ensured bi-partisan 
continuity had stopped working with the creation and continuous electoral growth of Frente 
Amplio. In the short run, the main objective of the reform was accomplished, with the 
Colorado party maintaining the presidency in 1999. Moreover, in the short-run, internal 
                                                 
1 ?????? ??? ????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ????
Uruguayan party system. Some authors have called these political units factions (see Coppedge 1994: 199; 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b: 425). Following Sartori (1976), we will not use the term faction because it has 
??????????? ?????????????? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ????? ??? ?? ??????????? ???? ???????? facere?. Also, we 
consider this definition misleading since fractions are more permanent than factions (such as the circumstantial 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
identities is directed toward fraction rather than political parties. (Altman 2000: ft7 at p.278-279). Even though it 
is relatively common for political parties to be internally divided into fractions and sometime factions, the peculiarity 
of the Uruguayan case is that these party fractions show great political visibility, to the point that in many cases they 
have been considered as real parties inside parties (Lindahl 1977). Nevertheless, Uruguayan parties are still parties, 
as many scholars have argued (González 1993; Mieres 1992)??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? (Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes 1998). 
2 In this paper, party fragmentation refers to the number of political parties in the party system, and party 
fractionalization refers to the number of fractions within parties (or lemas to be more precise). 
3 Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the relations between the two parties were mostly 
belligerent. Although Uruguayan politics during the nineteenth century were basically centered on fraud, 
abstention, and uprisings, agreements between political elites were frequent. The so-?????????????????????????????
in Uruguay (Colorado and Blanco) are older than the country itself. There is scholarly consensus that these two 
political groups emerged in the battle of Carpintería (1836), when they fought against each other in a civil war, 
the Guerra Grande, six years after the adoption of the first constitution and eight after ???? ??????????
independence. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
they were strong political organizations with mass following ?and even armies? and they survived to the 
?????????(González 1995: 140).  
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debate on the constitutional project triggered significant conflicts within FA leading for 
?????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??????????s historical leader, in February 1996. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
traditional party-system from its challengers. 
Notwithstanding, the 1996 constitutional reform process was punctuated by intense 
negotiations among the traditional parties, the Nuevo Espacio, and some moderate leaders of 
Frente Amplio. Although such a broad coalition was unnecessary to approve the 
Constitutional reform in Congress, the project should also be ratified in a popular plebiscite. 
Therefore, the project should not only be functional to the interest of both traditional parties, 
but should also seek to accommodate broader interest in order to generate a critical mass of 
partisan support for the reform. Moreover, facing the challenge of making the reform 
legitimate and worthy in the eyes of the citizenry, interest should be dressed with reasons. 
Therefore, while the reform left some historical features of the system untouched (i.e. strict 
proportional representation, the number of seats in both chambers, the size of electoral 
districts, and compulsory voting), a series of additional measures besides the introduction of a 
runoff electoral system to substitute the plurality vote for the presidential election were 
included:  a) the double simultaneous vote (DSV) was eliminated for the presidency and 
mandatory party primaries were introduced, compelling parties to present only one 
presidential candidate;  b) for congressional elections, deputies were forbidden to build ad-
hoc intra-?????? ?????????? ????????? ???????????? ?????????????, in Uruguayan jargon) among 
diverse groups in order to win within the party (i.e. it no longer made it possible for deputies 
from different fractions within the same party to ally seeking to accumulate their votes); and 
c) the absolute concurrency of elections (presidential, congressional, and municipal) ended. 
Whereas the first two of these reforms addressed historical concerns of the left (Frente 
Amplio and the Nuevo Espacio), the third was sought to benefit the Blanco party by splitting 
municipal elections (in which this party was stronger than the Colorado) from presidential and 
congressional races.  
Is has to be said that, since its maturity in 1942, the Uruguayan electoral system presented 
a series of characteristics that, taken together, make this a very unusual case in the democratic 
world (Altman 2002; Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes 1998). One of its most original 
characteristics was the use of the double and triple simultaneous vote, with voters simultaneously 
electing at two levels: within and between parties (Altman and Chasquetti 2005). All elections in 
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Uruguay used to be connected (vinculadas) and concurrent, making the voter cast a ballot for the 
same party at all office-levels (see Figure 5 of a ballot paper in Uruguay). Actually, voters 
simultaneously selected candidates to six representative posts: 1) President and Vice-president, 
2) Senate, 3) Deputies, 4) Departmental Major, 5) Departmental Legislators (ediles), and 6) 
Departmental Electoral Courts.  
In Uruguay Congress is still elected with proportional representation in both chambers. 
For the thirty members of the senate the whole country forms a unique national district. Also, 
in lower-chamber elections (99 members) the entire country is taken as a unique national 
district for distributing legislators among the lemas. However, Uruguay has 19 districts for 
distributing deputies among the sublemas and fractions within each sublema. Due to the fact 
that the 19 circumscriptions vary considerably in their size (from 2 to 45), there is another 
electoral operation that fits (corrects) the national vote for that list and the number of deputies 
that each department has.4  In this mathematical correction, it is possible to observe that some 
departments yield deputies to others in order to maintain the most proportional system of 
representation possible. It is interesting to note that although Uruguay has two chambers, both 
overlap their representativeness and both are elected through an integral proportional 
representation system.  
The Uruguayan electoral system was designed to maintain a two-party system, allowing 
fractions with?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
elected. In other words, the electoral system was both a cause and a consequence of 
?????????? ??????????????? ?????????. The DSV created a strong incentive for cooperation 
among sub-lemas, while nationwide PR actuates as a strong incentive for competition among 
them. Nonetheless, the system did not succeed in avoiding the emergence of a third force. The 
bipartisan configuration ended in 1971, with the creation of the Frente Amplio (FA) 
(González 1993: 43). Table 1 below illustrates the evolution of the main characteristics of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
                                                 
4 This is call??????????????????????????? 
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Table 1: Uruguayan presidents and Constitutions since Polyarchy  
1919 Baltasar Brum PC 1919 NCA: Feliciano Viera PC Constitution of 1917.  
Semi-Collegiate (Executive power 
was divided between two bodies, the 
President and the National Council of 
Administration).  
Chamber: 123 (PR); Senate: 19 
(PLU)
Renovation of NCA every two years.  
   1921 NCA: José Batlle y Ordóñez PC 
1923 José Serrato PC 1923 NCA: Julio M. Sosa PC 
   1925 NCA: Luis A. de Herrera PN 
1927 J.Campisteguy  PC 1927 NCA: Luis C. Caviglia PC 
   1929 NCA: Juan P. Fabini PC 
1931 Gabriel Terra PC 1931 NCA: Baltasar Brum PC 
   1933 NCA: Antonio Rubio PC 
1933-1934- Gabriel Terra  ???????????? 
1934 Gabriel Terra PC Constitution of 1934.  
Chamber: 99 (PR); Sen. 30 (15 y 15).  
Obligatory participation of both 
parties in Ministers council.  
1938 Alfredo Baldomir PC 
1943 Juan José de Amézaga PC Constitution of 1942. 
Chamber: 99 (PR); Senate 30 (PR).  
Freedom for the president in his 
power of appointment of ministers 
1947 Tomás Berreta  PC 
1947 Luis Batlle Berres PC 
1951 Andrés Martínez Trueba PC 
  1952 NCG: Andrés Martínez Trueba  PC 
Constitution of 1952.  
?????????????????. Executive Power: 
Consejo Nacional de Gobierno, 
(composed by 9 members directly 
elected by citizens. Six counselors 
for the most voted list of the most 
voted lema and three for the lema 
that follows in number of votes but 
distributed proportionally among its 
lists).5 
  1955 NCG: Luis Batlle Berres  PC 
  1956 NCG: Alberto F. Zubiría  PC 
  1957 NCG: Arturo Lezama  PC 
  1958 NCG: Carlos L. Fischer  PC 
  1959 NCG: Martín R. Echegoyen  PN 
  1960 NCG: Benito Nardone  PN 
  1961 NCG: Eduardo V. Haedo  PN 
  1962 NCG: Faustino Harrison  PN 
  1963 NCG: Daniel Fernandez Crespo  PN 
  1964 NCG: Luis Giannattasio  PN 
  1965 NCG: Washington Beltrán PN 
  1966 NCG: Alberto Heber  PN 
1967 Oscar D. Gestido  PC Constitution of 1967: Uni-personal 
presidency. Incorporation of 
mechanisms of referendum and 
popular initiative). 
1967 Jorge Pacheco Areco PC 
1971 Juan María Bordaberry PC 
1976 Alberto Demicheli  
Dictatorship (1973-1985) 
(Constitution of 1967 suspended) 
1976 Aparicio Mendez 
1980 Lieutenant Gral. Gregorio Álvarez 
Interim: Rafael Addiego Bruno 
1985 Julio María Sanguinetti PC 
Constitution of 1967. 1990 Luis Alberto Lacalle PN 
1995 Julio María Sanguinetti PC 
2000 Jorge Batlle PC Constitution of 1996. 2005 Tabaré Vázquez FA 
 
                                                 
5 More on collegial executives could be found at Altman (2008), Sacchi (1999).
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The reasons on which citizen support for the reform of 1996 was requested derived 
from some of the anticipated consequences of the four amendments address above. On the 
one hand, the runoff would enable the crafting of stronger government coalitions, breaking 
the frequent congressional stalemate that the previous system created. On the other hand, the 
introduction of unique presidential candidacies, the restriction of the DVS, and the separation 
of elections would ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????her liberty to select candidates from different parties at different 
governmental levels.  
Whereas our evidence will show that the first reason on which reform was advocated 
was unfunded (coalitional politics was further complicated after the reform was introduced), 
we will claim that the second series of reasons ????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????????????
more accurately predicted and promised. Precisely, the effects of the additional reforms 
introduced to accommodate the interests of a broad partisan coalition and to lower the 
prominence of the runoff system within the reform package, ended up producing more harm 
than good to traditional parties.  
Interacting with long-term sociopolitical and economic processes, the negative 
externalities (from the point of view of reformers) produced by the 1996 Constitutional 
reform significantly favored the electoral chances of Frente Amplio, which reached 
presidential office in the election of 2004 on the basis of an absolute majority of the popular 
vote. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the two traditional parties won the presidency. Although such outcome cannot be explained 
only as the by-product of the unanticipated consequences of the 1996 Constitutional reform 
(see i.e. the works in Buquet 2005; see i.e. the works in Lanzaro 2004), we will claim that 
those externalities contributed to reduce the ability of traditional parties to compete with 
Frente Amplio.  
The paper is organized around two sections. We first enter to a more detailed 
description of political negotiation and the reform process leading to the enactment of the 
1996 Constitutional reform, providing evidence on the conjunction of interests and reasons 
that crystallized in the popularly approved reform package. Because of limitations of space, 
this paper skips a historical constitutional evolution of Uruguay since 1917, focusing on the 
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most important differences existing among ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
1942, 1952, 1967, and 1996), but this could be found elsewhere.6  In any case, an historical 
??????????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ???? ???? ???????????? ???? ??? ??????????? ????????????? ??? ????
country serve as a particular instance of constitution-making as normal politics in Latin 
America. In this case, those processes of constitution-making were essentially targeted at 
maintaining the primacy of the traditional party-system and were usually introduced in the 
context of democratic procedures. The second section explores the long-term consequences of 
the reform. Finally, we conclude stressing the theoretical contributions of this case to the 
comparative project on constitutional reforms.  
2. Political and Institutional Causes of the 1996 Reforms  
In this section, we first describe the political context in which the 1996 Constitutional 
reform was proposed. We then impute interests to relevant political actors and describe the 
reasons they provided for favoring or opposing the reform. Finally, a description of the 
enacted reforms is provided. Both interests and reasons are treated as the expected outcomes 
of the reform. In the third section of the paper, we then explore short and long-term outcomes 
linked to the reform, assessing the degree to which those expected outcomes were fulfilled.  
?????????? ??????????? ?????-?????? ???????? ????? ?? ????? ???? ?? ?????????? ??????????????
which once again proved short-lived (Altman 2000). Growing inflation and declining real 
wages led to a sharp-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
same levels than those shown by Sanguinetti at the end of the previous term. During his first 
years in office, Lacalle promoted liberalizing and privatizing measures, crystallized in the Ley 
de Empresas Públicas approved in Congress. However, this law was challenged by a 
referendum promoted by state-unions and Frente Amplio and then supported by Foro 
Batllista (the Colorado fraction led by Sanguinetti). In December of 1992, the citizenry 
rejected the law leaving the government without one of its main policy platforms. 
Additionally, during this period, five proposals to reform the pension system were introduced, 
with all of them, failing to crystallize in a consensual agreement (Castiglioni 2005). 
                                                 
6 For a more legalistic description of the Constitutional evolution of Uruguay see (Gros Espiell 2002).  
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Meanwhile, resulting from his governing style in Montevideo, Tabaré Vázquez 
consolidated as a highly popular leader, becoming a central player for the election of 1994. In 
those elections, Sanguinetti from the Colorado party succeeded in wining his second 
presidential election, while Frente Amplio was re-elected to the Municipal Government of 
Montevideo. However, at the presidential level, this time the electorate was divided in almost 
equal thirds, with the Colorado Party (PC) obtaining 32.3%, the Blanco Party (PN) 31.2%, 
and Frente Amplio 30.6%. This electoral outcome catalyzed the creation of a stronger 
traditional-party coalition after the election.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????, increasing the perceived costs of loosing office for both traditional 
parties. While before 1994 loosing office meant that the other traditional party would win but 
without a majority, now the implications were far more drastic as both traditional parties 
would be left out of office. Historically, both traditional parties shared access to the state and 
were therefore able to distribute patronage and pork on that basis. If neither the Blanco nor 
the Colorado party were in office, the very sources of both t??????????? ????????? ??????????
loyalties would be seriously hindered. However, there is a qualitative shift from co-
participation towards coalitional rule.  
Filgueira and Filgueira (1997) have argued that the incentive structure for the usual 
?????? ?????? ????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????? ???????. Such strategy was 
conducive to frequent decisional stalemates and allowed the traditional party in the opposition 
to benefit from the votes lost by the incumbent. Moreover, co-participation practices were 
mostly based on pork distribution not frequently tied, as this time, to an explicit reformist 
agenda. Interestingly, the coalition between the two traditional parties arose when the growth 
of the left substantially brought into question their capacity to maintain the presidential office. 
In this scenario and together with other significant reforms (social security and education) 
both traditional parties promoted changes on electoral rules from a simple plurality election to 
a runoff electoral system, closing the door on an immediate electoral victory of the left. Thus, 
in spite of their shrinking electoral support, a second-round electoral alliance between both 
parties would imply the need for the left to get more than 50% of the vote on its own, in order 
to gain the presidential office. 
The rationale behind the establishment of this new instance seems clear, as its most 
important justification was to prevent the victory of the left. Given that the electoral bases of 
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the traditional parties are ideologically closer each other than to the FA, if forced in a second 
round to choose between a traditional party against a leftist candidate, they should arguably 
vote for the former rather than for the latter. Although it implies a counterfactual, it seems 
extremely plausible to think that, without having changed the rules, the Frente Amplio would 
have won the 1999 election, as it obtained almost 40% of the votes in the first round (Buquet 
2000).  
In 1999, and for the first time since the transition, the same party was able to maintain 
the presidency. Although Frente Amplio won the first electoral round, the coalition of 
Blancos and Colorados was able to defeat the left in the presidential runoff. This time, after 
successfully contesting the primary against foristas, ????????????????????????????????. Although 
Lacalle successfully won the Blanco primary on the basis of his political apparatus (defeating 
an adversarial Juan Andrés Ramírez who competed on the basis of corruption charges against 
Lacalle and Alberto Volonté), his candidacy was fatally wounded as a result of that process of 
internal competition. This led to an historical defeat of the Blanco Party, which only obtained 
22% of the vote. Within Frente Amplio, the primary between Vázquez and Danilo Astori 
confirmed once again the absolute primacy of the former in the fight for leading the leftist 
coalition. The Nuevo Espacio (a small center-left party) contested the election on its own, 
obtaining half of its original support, and quickly allied with Frente Amplio after the first 
round. 
The inclusion of this set of additional provisions in the reform, seen as positive steps 
removing some of the ???????? ??? ???????????? ????????? ???????????? ???? ??????????? ????city, 
moved Astori and Seregni from the Frente Amplio to favor the reform openly contesting 
????????????????. This fact fueled important degrees of internal dissent in the party that ended 
up ????????????????????????????????????????????????the Frente Amplio and the strengthening of  
????????????????????? 
 
Negotiating the Constitution of 1996 
The proposal, discussion, and establishment of constitutional reforms is not a symptom 
of any particular stressful situation in Uruguay, since the expedient of constitutional reform 
has been, as previously seen, used many times during the last century as a mechanism to 
overcome different political stalemates that challenged the traditional party politics. In 
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Uruguay, politics have a strong emphasis on a juridical dimension and its most important 
political institutions are included in the constitution, with relatively highly detailed 
regulations. In other words, the constitution must be changed whenever there is a move to 
introduce some institutional experiment. Even though the political reform was a permanent 
discussion topic from the very beginning of the democratic restoration (1985), the actual 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ation (1995-1999).  
Nonetheless, the requisites to pass the reform were extremely high, requiring the 
support of two thirds of the legislature and a popular ratification in a plebiscite. So, the 
amendment process required crafting a great consensus among the political elite. Moreover, 
after such consensus was built, the proposal should also look legitimate and worth-pursuing 
for the citizenry. Therefore, reforms needed to accommodate the interests of a diverse set of 
political actors (parties and fractions), while remaining attractive to the public. 
The sixth constitutional reform in the history of the country was finally approved in 
December 1996, with the support of 50.4% of the valid vote, one of the closest results in the 
?????????? electoral history. That day, citizens ratified the constitutional reforms agreed by 
both traditional parties and the Nuevo Espacio. Meanwhile, the reform was opposed by the 
Frente Amplio. The reform introduced significant changes in the rules of the political game; 
especially in the structure of the electoral system. Additionally, a regulatory framework for 
partisan activities was included, along with some changes regarding executive-legislative 
relations.  
The new electoral rules, first applied for the 1999 electoral cycle, modified three of the 
four main characteristics of the Uruguayan electoral system. The only feature that was left intact 
was the use of proportional representation for legislative elections (Espíndola 2001; Finch 
1995). First, the plurality system for the election of the President was replaced by the two-
ballot majority system. Second, the use of multiple simultaneous vote was drastically reduced as 
now each party could only run one presidential candidate and a maximum of three candidates for 
municipal mayor. Moreover, the accumulation by sublemas for the election of representatives 
was eliminated. Third, the all-concurrent election system changed to a partially non-
concurrent system, in which elections were disconnected and separated (the primaries from the 
general election, the national from the municipal election, and, to a certain extent, the 
parliamentary from the presidential election). The 1996 Constitution broke down the electoral 
process into four stages: mandatory party primaries, legislative and presidential elections, a 
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second round or ballotage if no presidential candidate obtained at least 50% of the vote, and 
municipal elections. A fourth important change was the elimination of the distinction between 
???????????? ???? ????????????? lemas, allowing new parties to present a series of lists for the 
parliamentary election.7  In fact, the electoral system underwent so significant changes that in the 
long term, massive transformations in the dynamics of the political system can be expected. 
Additionally, relevant changes were also introduced in regulations affecting the 
functioning of political parties. First, the restriction forcing parties to present only one candidate 
to the presidency has brought a fundamental change in the patterns of traditional parties internal 
competition. Since 1999, all parties should hold simultaneous and mandatory primary and 
internal elections. The results of the primaries are then subjected to a Sore Loser Law: those 
who are not elected in this instance cannot run again under other party level in any other 
election of the electoral cycle. In other words, if someone looses, she must wait for another 
five years in order to run ????????????????????????????(Altman and Castiglioni 2006). This rule, 
also obliges parties to select national conventions of 500 members plus an equal number of 
substitutes. Additionally, those parties who seek to take part in municipal elections should also 
elect departmental conventions with a minimum of 50 members. This set of requirements has 
acted against the survival of tiny parties that used to be part of Uruguayan electoral folklore.  
Overall, the main strategic goal of the constitutional reform has been achieved insofar 
as the new electoral rules, specifically the majority run-off, favored the maintenance of the 
reformist coalition in office. But things turned out differently to what had been originally 
planned. The winning party was the PC and not the PN, and the majority factions within the 
parties were radicals rather than moderates. The difference between the actual outcome and 
what was expected stems from a number of erroneous calculations in the original plan, and 
some strategic mistakes made during the electoral campaigns (Buquet and Piñeiro 2000). The 
remainder of this paper is devoted to explain the short and long-term effects of the 1996 
Constitutional reform.  
 
                                                 
7 From 1966 until the 1994 election, only "permanent" parties, i.e. those that already has parliamentary 
representation, had the prerogative to present more than one candidate/list per party, that is to say to benefit from 
the multiple simultaneous vote. 
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3. Causes and Effects of the 1996 Reform 
In this section we contrast the reasons and interests of reformers with the short and 
long-term effects of enacted reforms. As we shall see, several externalities (frequently 
contradicting the reformers intentions) can also be observed in this case. We organize this 
section around three bundles that combine specific reforms enacted in 1996: a) the 
introduction of a runoff system, b) the introduction of primaries, unique-presidential 
candidacies, and partially non-concurrent elections; and c) the restriction of the Double-
Simultaneous Vote. For each bundle we identify the expected effect of the reform (from the 
point of view of reformers), the observed effect (in the short and long run), and the presence 
and character of externalities. Table 2 summarizes the argument we present in this section. 
 
 
3.1 The Majority run-off  
Interests and Reasons 
Historically, both traditional parties shared access to the state and were therefore able to 
distribute patronage and pork on that basis. If neither the Blanco nor the Colorado party were 
??????????? ????????? ???????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????????????? ??????????
hindered. In this scenario and together with other significant reforms (social security and 
education),8 both traditional parties promoted an electoral reform changing the electoral rules 
from a simple plurality election to a runoff electoral system, closing the way for an immediate 
electoral victory of the left. Thus, in spite of their shrinking electoral support, a second-round 
electoral alliance between both parties would imply the need for the left to get more than 50% 
of the vote on its own, in order to gain the presidential office. 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of these reforms see (Castiglioni 2005).  
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Table 2: Mapping-up incentives, reasons, and externalities 
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Different reasons were advocated in favor of the run-off. Some were very explicit about 
?????????????????????????????????????. For instance, the Colorado Senator Luis Pozzolo bluntly 
stated:  
???????????????????????????????ación entre dos partidos que, aunque tienen 
filosofías distintas, representan en lo institucional, como respeto democrático, 
??????????????????????????????????? ???????. [Pero las cosas han cambiado,] 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????ente; el país puede 
llegar a tener, si no hace esta reforma, un gobierno de signo marxista. Y esto 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.  
In a somewhat more veiled way, Ope Pasquet (former deputy of the PC) argued that the 
runoff would se???? ??? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??????
???????????????????????????(Búsqueda N° 844, 23/05/1996, p.6).  
In general, more prominent traditional party leaders argued for the reform on the basis 
of more sophisticated reasons, usually stressing the capacity of the runoff to induce more 
effective coalition building and governance. For instance, former President Luis Alberto 
Lacalle argued that:  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????aumentar su base 
de apoyo [dedicándose a] conquistar, enrolar, negociar y conceder ciertas 
cosas a otras fuerzas políticas para fabricar de antemano una coalición que le 
????????????????????????De manera que en el ballotage lo que se plebiscita es 
?????????????????????????(Lacalle, Búsqueda N° 867, 31/10/1996, 13). 
In this line, promoters of the reform argued that single presidential candidates and less 
fractionalized parties would induce more disciplined legislative behavior and greater incentives 
for coalition building. Former President Julio María Sanguinetti argued this point stating that:  
?Todos los partidos estuvieron de acuerdo en que se debe procesar una 
reforma y ella es necesaria ante tiempos nuevos, con problemas distintos (y) 
con una enorme fragmentación elector??? ???? Es necesario ajustar 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Conversely, most leaders of the left opposed this reform on the basis of one simple 
institutional reason. As Senator Korzeniak (Socialist) warned:  
?Un ballotage que traiga a un presidente con 55% o 60% de apoyo y un 
Parlamento (en el) que tiene 30% de apoyo puede generar una situación 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????da 
N° 867, 31/10/1996, p. 13).  
Likewise, Tabaré Vázquez alleged that: 
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???eamos la figura del presidente emperador. Esto es peligroso para 
cualquiera que sea el presidente de la República, porque va a tener el 51% de 
los votos con un Parlamento dividido, va a haber un enfrentamiento de 
poderes, el Poder Legislativo va a estar disminuido en sus poderes, vamos a 
tener un super-??????????? ???? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ?????
7/11/1996, p.10). 
Moreover, FA leaders essentially campaigned unveiling the short-term interest (and its 
consequences) hidden behind the reasons advocated by traditional party leaders. Vázquez 
foresaw the short-term outcomes of the reform brilliantly:  
?No le quepa a nadie dudas que si gana la elección el Encuentro Progresista 
[Frente Amplio] como seguramente las va a ganar en 1999, y esta es la gran 
preocupación por esta reforma constitucional que es más una reforma 
electoral, y sale segundo un partido tradicional, van a acumular los partidos 
tradicionales en la segunda vuelta para la candidatura a la Presidencia. Esto 
lo han dicho los propios dirig?????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????????????? ??????????
Búsqueda N° 870, 21/11/1996, p. 7).  
 
Short-term effects: Winning the 1999 Election but without Improving Coalition Building and 
Governance (1999-2005) 
The runoff for the presidency was one of the most relevant of the changes introduced in 
the 1996 reform, if not the most. As previously explained, the short term interest of reformers 
was to avoid having the left arriving into the national executive. This objective was fulfilled 
in the short-run, with Jorge Batlle (coming second in the first round) defeating Tabaré 
Vázquez from the Frente Amplio in the runoff. At that point, Batlle received the support from 
leaders of the Blanco Party.  
The second advocated reason for reform was to improve coalition building. This 
reasoning involved the assumption that by inducing an electoral coalition for the second 
presidential round, the reform will definitely strengthen the presidential coalition. This would 
also be reinforced by other expected effects of the runoff (and a series of other reforms 
introduced in 1996) as the reduction of the effective number of parties which would put a halt 
to partisan fragmentation. We now explore the effects of the reform in regard to these 
objectives.  
A first reading of the introduction of the runoff system from the point of view of 
coalition building would indeed suggest that this new institutional device would strengthen 
post-electoral coalition formation and party discipline. Yet an overlooked fact suggests 
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exactly the opposite. In order to gain office, a traditional party only had to have a bigger share 
than the other in the first round. As it was unthinkable that the other traditional party would 
then shift its vote to the left and given vote share distribution among the three parties, office 
was secured. Thus, while in one sense coalitions should have become more stable, other 
forces and logics pushed exactly in the opposite direction. The end result was a coalition in 
which neither partner wanted to stand out with unpopular measures and especially with fiscal 
adjustment. Eventually, this coalitional configuration ended-up contributing to deepen the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
support for the opposition in the subsequent election (the Frente Amplio).  
With regard to the effects of the runoff on the effective number of parties (N) and 
candidates, extant research consensually claims that N is systematically higher when that 
institutional device is used in presidential elections.9  Therefore, in theory, Uruguayan 
politicians were mistaken in expecting less fragmentation to occur under the new system. 
However, strictly speaking, under the new majority runoff system party fragmentation did not 
increase in Uruguay. In fact, it decreased from 3.4 to 2.5, contradicting the theory and 
????????? ???????????? ????????????? ????????????? ????? ??????? ??. Nonetheless, a more careful 
reading of election results shows that fragmentation did in fact increased (Buquet 2004). In 
short, the observed fall in the magnitude of N could be better explained as the result of a 
tendency that begun before the reform was introduced and could not be attributed to a direct 
effect of the new electoral system.  
                                                 
9 See Shugart and Carey (1992), Jones (1995), and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) on this point. 
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Figure 1: Effective Number of Parties 
 
Source: ???????????????ation based on information from the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la 
República, Data Bank.  
 
To illustrate this claim, the impact of the new electoral system can be better observed by 
comparing the electoral results of the national elections for which the majority run-off system 
was used with the electoral results obtained in the subsequent local elections, in which the 
plurality system was maintained. The comparison is reasonable because parties and voters 
were the same in both contests, within a short time span. The next table shows the values of N 
for the 19 local electoral districts in Uruguay, both for national and local elections held after 
the electoral reform. When compared to the results obtained in the corresponding national 
election, the value of N is strictly less in 37 of the 39 local elections. Therefore, we can see a 
clear pattern of strategic electoral concentration in local elections that did not occurred at the 
national level. This could happen because the plurality system poses incentives to vote 
strategically that the majority run-off system does not promote.  
Furthermore, we have classified departments into two sub-??????? ?????????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tive N's 
due to the growing trend of the FA (Table 4 below). ??????????????????????????????????????
those where the left has had historically its best electoral performances. This group shows a 
clear descending trend in the number of parties due to the electoral growth of the FA. By 
?????????????? ????????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ?????? ??????? ???
important electoral share. These ones show a clear contrast in the number of parties contesting 
local and national elections. While for national elections and under a majority runoff N is 
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higher, at local elections the number falls down to form a strict bipartisan system. In this case 
and besides the national trend of reduction in the number of parties, we can observe the 
strategic incentives introduced by the plurality system. Indeed, the observed reduction of N 
(from 3 to 2.6 in the effective number of parties) in between national elections (1999 and 
2004) occurring in traditional departments can be solely explained by the electoral growth of 
FA. Meanwhile, the 2.1 N observed for both local elections (2000 and 2005) is obviously 
caused by strategic voting. 
Table 4: Effective Number of Parties by Uruguayan departments 
Department 1999 2000 2004 2005 
Montevideo 2,7 2,3 2,2 2,2 
Canelones 3,2 2,6 2,4 2,0 
Maldonado  3,2 3,0 2,5 2,2 
Rocha 3,2 2,7 2,6 2,3 
Salto 3,1 2,9 2,6 2,9 
Paysandú 3,1 2,8 2,3 2,3 
Río Negro 3,1 3,0 2,6 2,3 
Soriano 3,1 2,9 2,5 2,3 
Colonia 3,3 2,8 2,6 2,2 
Florida 3,2 2,9 2,7 2,6 
Mean "moderns" 3,1 2,8 2,5 2,3 
Treinta y Tres 3,1 2,3 2,5 2,4 
Cerro largo 3,1 2,0 2,5 2,1 
Rivera 2,9 2,5 2,8 2,6 
Artigas 2,9 2,3 2,6 2,9 
San José 3,2 1,8 2,5 2,0 
Flores 3,0 1,5 2,6 1,7 
Durazno 3,0 2,4 2,7 2,2 
Lavalleja 3,0 2,4 2,7 1,8 
Tacuarembó 3,0 1,8 2,4 1,7 
Mean"traditionals" 3,0 2,1 2,6 2,1 
Source: A??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
 
Therefore, we can argue that the decreasing N observed after the implementation of the 
majority runoff system is not an effect of this institutional devise. Conversely, our evidence 
shows that if the continuity of the plurality system could have granted a greater decrease in 
fragmentation than the one obtained after the 1996 reform was implemented. 
Another explicit objective for introducing the runoff was to avoid Presidents having to 
govern with minority legislative support. However, the combination of single candidates and 
the majority runoff system that the electoral reform set up, could contribute to worsening the 
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parliamentary position of the elected President, and this is in fact what happened the first time 
it was put into practice. 
Figure 2: presidential legislative contingents 
 
Source: Authors' elaboration based on information from the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Data Bank. 
 
The old Uruguayan electoral system made for at least two absolute certainties: the party 
of the President would have a plurality (at least) in parliament, which meant that it would 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n would 
have a plurality within his own party as well. Congress-members directly supporting the 
President had, up to that time, necessarily been the biggest group in the biggest party. This 
was guaranteed by the connection existing between presidential and legislative elections. In 
short, to win the Presidency it was simultaneously necessary to belong to the party that 
received the most votes for the legislature and to head the fraction within that party that 
received the largest plurality.  
Under the current rules, the legislative representation of the party in government does 
not have to be the biggest in parliament because there is nothing to stop the election of the 
candidate of the second party, whose representation would be second in number of legislators. 
This happened in the 1999 election. Along with the reduction in the legislative weight of the 
???????????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ????????? ??????? (Jones 1995) there is no 
disposition in the new constitution which guar??????? ???????????? ??????? ??? ???? ????????????
faction. The President elected is the only candidate from his party, and he can be voted along 
with any of the parliamentary lists of that party. ???????????????????????????????????????????????
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are relatively independent from the electoral potential he has, and consequently, he may be in 
a minority position within his party. Therefore, nothing ensures that the President will enjoy a 
majority in her party because there is nothing that could stop fractions that were defeated in 
the internal party elections from emerging triumphant in the legislative election. 
 
Main Externality of the runoff system: Consolidating a bi-polar logic of partisan competition 
With the resumption of democratic politics the main features of the traditional system 
were restored. However, facing a growing and powerful leftist opposition and confronting 
increasing public deficits and inflationary pressures, both traditional parties embarked on 
reformist agendas. The fiscal crisis of the state also limited the scope for reproducing loyalties 
on the basis of traditional clientelistic and patronage appeals, which became increasingly 
inefficient for competing with a leftist party that had programmatically appropriated the 
defense of batllismo and was able to mobilize discontent against neoliberal reformers. 
Although the Uruguayan party system lacked a strong advocate for neoliberal reform in 
spite of the specter of a crumbling economy and increasing international pressure, once in 
office the traditional parties embarked on gradual attempts at state-reform. Given the 
omnipresence of batllista or statist/redistributive ideology and significant policy feedback 
from ISI, these reforms were, not surprisingly, extremely unpopular. In this context, the 
Frente ???????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????????????
same time, drawing on a reinterpretation of batllismo to attract votes from the sectors that 
became increasingly alienated from the traditional system in the wake of t??? ???????
????????? ??????. Ideologically, this coalition put forth a statist platform advocating and 
enacting legislation (through the use of direct democracy mechanisms) to roll-back reformist 
legislation in favor of the status-quo (strong state intervention in the domestic economy). 
Additionally, while the two traditional parties faced surmounting popular discontent and 
managed increasingly constraining budgets in order to maintain their clientelistic political 
machines, the Frente Amplio was able to gradually become the most popular political party in 
the country. The strength of the frenteamplista subculture solidified through exile and 
resistance to the repression and persecution during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, 
combined with the loosening ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ????????
room for the transformation of the party-system.  
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This dynamic, coupled with electoral results and the constitutional reform of 1996, 
crystallized two ideological families competing for votes based on programmatic appeals 
along the state-market divide. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????-polar logic 
of competition among three significant parties: the Blancos and the Colorados (in 
government) and Frente Amplio (in opposition). This competitive dynamic reduced the 
capacity of both traditional parties to keep their programmatic appeals differentiated.  
Therefore, while before the traditional party not occupying the presidential office could 
simultaneously benefit from co-participation while opposing the incumbent once the election 
approached, the runoff system made coalitional arrangements more explicit (though, as 
argued above, this did not get translated into greater governance efficiency). This helped to 
consolidate the formation of two clearly distinct (and more or less internally homogeneous) 
blocks: the government and the opposition; strengthening the latter at a time when economic 
discontent was on the rise.  
 
3.2 Primaries, internal party elections, unique presidential candidacies, and split elections 
Interests and Reasons 
Confronting the need to approve the reforms through a popular plebiscite, and having 
failed to do so in 1994, reformers needed to ensure a wide basis of support for this initiative. In 
this respect, the introduction of party-primaries and single presidential candidacies were 
advocated as natural counterparts of the majority runoff system. These particular reforms also 
addressed a long-standing claim of the left.10  ???????? ???????????? ??????? ??????? ???????
supported the reform due to this fact. For instance, Danilo Astori, leader of the largest fraction 
of Frente Amplio in the elections of 1994 persisted in favor of: 
??????????? ???? ???????? (el DVS y el uso de candidaturas presidenciales 
múltiples) que, pulverizándolo, alejan al sistema político de la gente, es 
verdaderamente un objetivo revolucionario, en el sentido estricto del 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
                                                 
10 As a matter of fact, the reforms of 1994 failed in part because the leftist parties accepted the primaries 
but not the balotage.  
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Indeed, the historical leader of Frente Amplio perfectly acknowledged the short-term 
effects of the reform: 
?Debemos de entenderlo como una lógica de la vida política y de la situación 
política [...] que nuestros adversarios no quieran que nosotros alcancemos el 
gobierno y el poder y mantenerse ellos en el ejercicio del mismo. [...] ¿O es 
que alguno de nosotros piensa que blancos y colorados van a pavimentar de 
pétalos de rosa nuestro camino de acceso al gobierno y al poder? (Liber 
Seregni, Búsqueda N° 830, 08/02/1996, pág. 4).  
Nonetheless, Seregni also supported the 1996 initiative due to the elimination of 
multiple presidential candidacies and the restriction of the DSV (we address the latter below).  
Interestingly, from within traditional parties, these elements of the reform were not 
consensually supported. For instance, Alem García (a Blanco congreso-member) argued that: 
??e propone un centralismo electoral, aumentar el poder de las cúpulas 
partidarias y, prácticamente, la eliminación de los dirigentes medios y 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Meanwhile, the separation of the municipal elections, which allowed voters to cast votes 
for different parties at different political levels, also provided greater legitimacy to the reform. In 
particular, this piece of legislation fulfilled the interest of the PN, which had deeper roots than 
the PC at the local level, in the interior of the country. 
Short-term effects: Passing the reform and increasing voter-freedom 
Reformers needed to create a wide basis of partisan and popular support to ensure that the 
runoff was enacted. These additional measures collected a great deal of support in the partisan 
spectrum, as well as in the public eye and provided the reform the necessary legitimacy to be 
(barely!) approved. Moreover, dissent within Frente Amplio launched an internal crisis, that in 
the short-term, might have also favored the electoral chance of traditional parties.  
Moreover, presidential elections with one single candidate per party along with the 
elimination of DVS for lower-chamber elections, have evidently given the electorate greater 
certainty with respect to the consequences of its vote. The splitting of the electoral cycle also 
made for a notable increase in voter freedom since it allowed them to opt for different parties at 
different governmental levels.  
Long-term effects: Are Primaries an effective mechanism for selecting presidential 
candidates?  
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It is hard to argue that mandatory party primaries provide a better mechanism for selecting 
candidates than the DSV (Buquet 2003).  
The constitutional reform of 1996 removed the double simultaneous vote for 
presidential elections, forcing parties to present single presidential candidates. In order to 
maintain the open competition that characterized traditional parties, the amendment 
established mandatory open primary elections. Since the new rules are in force, all parties 
???????? ??? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????
date.11  Internal elections serve two purposes: i) selecting the presidential candidate at each 
party, and ii) electing delegates to the national convention and the 19 departmental party 
conventions. The national party conventions are comprised of 500 members (elected by 
proportional representation) and have two purposes: a) to select the presidential candidate if 
no candidate received more than 50% of the popular vote, or more than 40% with at least a 10 
point margin over the second front runner; and b) to select the vice-presidential candidate.  
At first sight, the electoral reform would not seem to have generated any significant 
alterations from the previous model relating to the mechanisms of presidential candidate 
selection, since as before the fractions could designate pre-candidates. There are numerous 
forces at work, however, that will change the competition within and among parties. First, the 
rules to select the party presidential candidates have changed; under the new rules, candidates 
must win a primary by gaining either 50% of the vote or at least 40% with an advantage of 10 
points over the second front runner. If no candidate meets these requirements, a party 
convention chooses the candidate. This high threshold for winning the primary with the 
possibility of having the candidate chosen through the convention could yield a more 
fragmented system, as those observed under two-round electoral systems (Mainwaring and 
Shugart 1997b). 
In short, primary elections force candidates belonging to the same party to compete among 
themselves, highlighting their differences and potentially generating internal confrontations. 
Here ???? ??????????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ??????? ??? ???????????? ?????????? ????
difficult to find. The way a party handles the primary competition, then, has a great impact on 
                                                 
11 Citizen may vote in any party primary, but they may only participate in one. Part of the reasoning 
behind holding the primaries on the same day for all parties was to prevent voters from intervening in the affairs 
of more than one party.  
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the subsequent general election. It is normally accepted that parties that contain internal 
conflict do better in general elections. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
studies point toward divisive nomination campaigns contributing a negative effect to general 
???????????????????(Atkeson 1998: 257). Kenney and Rice (1987: 31) ??????????????????????
???? ?????? ???? ?? ????????? ???????? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????????????
uncontested, the divid??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
does not yet confirm these findings, but rather seems to suggest the existence of something 
like an optimal level of competitiveness in primaries, beyond which either higher or lower 
competition could damage the party.  
The three main parties have chosen different strategies to deal with the new primary system, 
and each party dealt with the situation differently in 2004 than they had in 1999. Most 
notably, there was a significant decrease in the primary competition in the more recent 
election. The FA had a somehow symbolic internal competition in 1999, but put forth only a 
single candidate in 2004. The PC had had a well-balanced competition between two 
candidates in 1999, but also put forth a hegemonic candidate in 2004. The PN, which in 1999 
had been excessively fragmented, ran just two main candidates in 2004 who competed 
without high levels of vitriol. If we link the degree of competitiveness of each primary contest 
to the electoral performance of each traditional party at the general election, we can see that 
when the effective number of candidates was close to 2 the party did well, and when this 
number moved away from 2, either up or down, the performance in the general election 
worsened (Table 3). This does not seem to be true for the FA, which had a very low level of 
competitiveness in both elections while their electoral growth continued an upward trend that 
started in 1971.  
 
Table 3: Effective number of presidential candidates in the traditional- parties primaries 
Election 
Year 
Partido Colorado Partido Nacional 
Ef. N° Candidates* Electoral Growth** Ef. N° Candidates* Electoral Growth** 
1999 2.0 0.4% 2.8 -8.9% 
2004 1.2 -22.2% 1.8 12.8% 
* Effective number of presidential candidates at the primary contest 
** Percentage of electoral growth related to the previous election 
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In sum, the notion of a well-balanced primary contest implies that in addition to running 
an effective number of candidates close to 2, the parties should work to minimize 
confrontation between the two front-runners. Therefore, along with an attractive primary 
contest, the party must offer a united image to avoid losing voters as the result of a conflict-
ridden primary. While too much confrontation can lead to an internal deterioration of the party, 
manipulating primaries to avoid confrontation has also been harmful for traditional parties. In 
2004 the major fractions of the PC unified behind a single candidate, thus distorting the primary 
process. The result, however, proved disastrous as the party lost badly in the general election. 
Again, since the DSV forces intra-party rivals to focus their campaigns more on inter-partisan 
rivalries, it allows internal party choice without yielding strenuous and divisive internal fights. 
The DSV, then, favored these parties, whereas primaries may damage them.  
The DSV presented an additional benefit both for parties and voters. Josep Colomer 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ular 
??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ????????????? ??????????? (2002: 119). This occurs due to the 
differences in who participates in the two rounds. ?????????? ??? ?? ?????????????????????????
reasoning can be clearly illustrated. The winning pre-candidate of a primary election should 
be the one who is the closest to the median voter within the partisan electorate. However, a 
centrist within a party may be an extremist for the whole electorate. A leftist party, therefore, 
would do better in the general election by choosing a candidate who is to the right of their 
median member and a rightist party would be best positioned by choosing a candidate to the 
left of their overall membership. The DSV resolves this problem for the parties too, in that it 
allows the parties to present a wide array of options to the whole electorate, therefore 
benefiting both the citizenry, which enjoys a wider menu, and the party, which does not limit 
its electoral appeal. 
????????? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ??????????
support these hypotheses. ??? ????? ???? ????? ??????g pre-candidate ?Lacalle? was without 
doubt closer to the median Blanco voter, but his defeated contender ?Ramírez? was much 
???????????????????????????????????????. Something similar could be said about the FA, whose 
winner, Vázquez, clearly showed a more radical profile than the defeated Astori. The winner 
in the Colorado internal election, Batlle, however, was ideologically placed more to the right 
than the defeated candidate, Hierro, but Batlle was still in a much better position with the 
entire elector???? ???? ???????????? ?????????????? ???? ????????? ??????????. In 1999, then, the 
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Colorados chose the best candidate for the general election and were successful. In 2004, the 
only party with a true primary was the PN, choosing Larrañaga over Lacalle. In this case 
Larrañaga was closer than Lacalle to the median voter; thus, contradicting ????????????002) 
claim that party militants would choose more extremist candidates. Even though the Blancos 
chose a centrist, the Frente Amplio won the general election in a landslide, in spite of running 
Vázquez who is positioned on the left of the ideological scale as the presidential candidate. In 
sum, the primaries have not always yielded winners who are more representative of their 
parties than the full electorate, and it is also unclear that these relatively extreme candidates 
are poor general election competitors, perhaps in part because the other parties also choose 
poorly. 
Moreover, holding primaries independently of the general election produced to 
additional  consequences: i) it lengthens the political campaigns and therefore ii) it increases 
the costs of campaigns and electoral processes. It is generally assumed that these are 
undesirable consequences for a political system, especially in a country where political or 
government spending is of high concern. The high costs of the electoral organization and the 
prolonged nature of campaigns can cause loathing and political distrust in the citizenry, thus 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????. At least one important advantage of the 
DSV system was its shorter campaign season due to the simultaneous holding of primary and 
general elections. The legislature did try to deal with the long campaign period by moving the 
primaries back from April to June, by a law in 2004. Primaries in April forced the parties to 
define their pre-candidates the previous year, and the move to June has resulted in a 
shortening of the calendar by considerably more than just two months.  
 
Main externality of the new election system: The increasing detachment between local and 
national partisan structures:  
A trend towards the de-nationalization of elections was observed in Uruguay, 
particularly in 1999-2000, with local electoral contests presenting diverging trends from 
national elections in some districts. Specifically, whereas the Blanco and Colorado parties 
benefited from such trend, the FA lost some of the electoral support it received in the 
presidential election (Guerrini 2000; Magri 2000). This can be explained by the separation of 
national and local elections, the consolidation of strong local leaderships, and the progressive 
popular disenchantment with national ones. In this context, Mayors gained autonomy and 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????. This trend was strengthened by the constitutional provision 
that established unique presidential candidates for every party contesting the election.  
In cases where supporting a national presidential candidacy seemed openly 
????????????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???? ????????????? ???????????? ???? ??????????? ???????????
??????? ???? ???????????? ??????????????? ?? ?????????? ????????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ???????? ????
primary (and presidential nomination) of their party (e.g. the case of Larrañaga in Paysandú, 
Da Rosa in Tacuarembó, or Cerdeña in San José), Mayors did not decisively help national 
leaders in their campaigns. After the first round, covert negotiations between local and 
national activists of both traditional parties also took place. For instance, in San José, Juan 
Ciruchí a former and extremely popular Herrerista mayor with a great personal following in 
the district exchanged his support for the candidacy of Colorado Jorge Batlle in the 
presidential runoff for Lista 15 support in his electoral battle against his former Municipal 
Secretary and incumbent Mayor: Cerdeña.12 
In 2005 however, likely following the national wave favoring FA, the levels of national-
local divergence were lower, granting the left eight Mayoralties (five previously held by the 
Blanco Party and three corresponding to the Colorado one), with first time electoral victories 
in municipal contests outside Montevideo. In turn, while the Colorado Party was only able to 
win (maintain) one Mayoralty, the Blanco Party obtained ten. 
 
3.3 The elimination of electoral cooperatives 
Interests, Reasons, and Short-Term Effects 
Eliminating the accumulation by sublemas was in the interest of the main national 
fractions, which could, as García anticipated, recentralize power within parties and eventually 
induce greater levels of congressional discipline and more effective governance. Nonetheless, 
the main short-term interest of reformers was the same than the one pursued through the 
reforms described in b; namely: to widen the potential political and electoral support for the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                 
12 Interviews with Juan Chiruchí, Miguel Zunino, and Jorge Cerdeña in San José (2003). 
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request regarding their elimination supported this rationale. Indeed, while defending the 
reform proposal, Danilo Astori from the Frente Amplio also attacked the effects of the triple 
DVS: 
???al sumar sus votos para perjudicar a otra mayoría] las cooperativas 
electorales ???????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??? ?????
28/11/1996, p. 72).  
The approval of the Constitutional reform in 1996 fulfilled the main short-term interest 
pursued by reformers. In the long-run, the additional interests of reformers were also fulfilled, 
leading to the centralization of power by national factions and a more direct linkage between 
upper and lower chamber lists.  
 
Long-Term Effects: Greater Transparency, a Decreasing Number of Lists for the House, and 
Greater Centralization of Power within Traditional Parties.  
The elimination of the accumulation of sublemas in the election of representatives has 
made for a very much simpler choice for the electorate, and this can be seen in the reduction 
in the number of lists presented in 1999 and 2004, which amounted to less than a half of those 
presented in 1994 (see Figure 2). As long as different lists for the House cannot accumulate 
their votes, the smaller ones have either to join one of the biggest or to build a single list 
among several of them. 
Figure 3: Number of Ballot Lists for the Chamber of Deputies 
Source: ???????????????????? based on information from the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Data Bank. 
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Moreover, the reduction in the legislative supply is associated with the predominance of 
big national fractions over local political groups. Under the new system, a rigid connection 
between the supply for the Senate and the supply for the House of Representatives is 
enforced. Consequently, we can expect more disciplined legislative behavior on the part of 
lower-chamber representatives.  
 
Figure 4: Effective Number of Senate Lists 
Source: A????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
In spite of the reduction in the number of lists of candidates, which has enormously 
reduced and simplified the supply to the electorate, the internal fractionalism of the political 
parties has not gone the same way. In this area, the reform does not seem to have had any 
particular impact, since the internal fractionalism of the Frente Amplio increased, that of the 
Blanco Party has been reduced, and that of the Colorado Party has held steady. As long as 
electoral rules for the Senate did not change we should not expect any changes in party 
fractionalism, but it could be argued that single presidential candidates pose incentives to 
more fragmented parties as long as the competition for president and for senate seats was 
disconnected (Buquet 2001). ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
such a process, while the opposite process at the traditional parties could be better explained 
due to their declining share of seats. 
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Main externality of the elimination of electoral cooperatives: The weakening of traditional 
???????????????????????????????? 
The simultaneous election of national and departmental party authorities in internal 
elections, combined with the new timing of elections and the elimination of the proliferation 
of lists in parliamentary elections have altered the internal balance between national and local 
partisan/fractional organizations. 
The joint effect of electoral reforms and the economic crisis that started in 1998 and got 
deepened during 2002 and 2003, have weakened the two most prominent national political 
apparatuses of the traditional parties (the Herrerismo in the Blanco Party and the Foro 
Batllista in the Colorado Party). It seems possible to claim that traditional parties have gone 
through a process of oligarchyzation, restricting the historically high levels of internal 
diversity that characterized each partisan offer and deterring wider participatory processes 
within parties. Concurrently, the partial elimination in 1996 of the DSV for the congressional 
lower-???????? ??????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ??????????? ??????????????? ????? ??????????? ???????
???????????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????? ???? ???????? ??????????? rastr??????? (catch-all partisan offer) 
open.  
As both a Colorado (Foro Batllista) and a Blanco (Herrerismo) local leader state: 
"They have discouraged the little ants. We are little, but we are the ones 
gathering votes for them. Before, every weekend, I went out to the countryside, 
to little towns, to talk to the people. ??????? ?? ?????? ??? ??? ???????. I have 
maintained the friendship with the people, but we cannot sacrifice friends for 
politics. ??? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ???????????????? ?????? ????. ??? ?????? ?????
anything now. So, we set up the list with a group of friends who had a good 
economic situation, so we did not have to promise anything. If someone came 
and ask for something, we just told them that we did not have anything to give. 
The only thing we promised was to try to force an internal change in the 
party". (Hubaré Aliano, Colorado local activist. interviewed by Luna, 2003).  
 
"The political power in Montevideo is forgetting us. ???? ??????? ?? ?????????
mistake. We cannot be connected only when they need us for the elections, 
there has to be a better way of staying in touch. ??????? ???? ?????????? ???
???????????? ??????? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??????. Now, national leaders have 
disappeared and that hurts the party. This time they did not provide political 
offices to us. Let????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. In 
the committee you have people working all year round and they are the ones 
keeping the presence of the party alive here. Then, when elections come they 
benefit from that. But when we go there, they shut the door on your face. And if 
the party has no reciprocity with us, we cannot provide for the people. Then, 
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how can I go and ask them for their vote?" (Juan Creceri, Blanco local 
activist, interviewed by Luna, 2003). 
Paradoxically, the weakening of party territorial structures enhanced the need of 
individual congress-members to stay personally in the field. This is particularly important for 
non-Metropolitan congress-members, which face specific constituent demands that cannot be 
addressed through the media. Along these lines, a Colorado congress-member points to the 
changes brought about by the increasing restriction of clientelistic side-payments in the 
system: 
"New opportunities had been created. You have to get to the ground from the 
heights and be close to the people. Talk to them, give them opinions, and 
inform them. Before the congress-member visit every location once a year, at 
most. And then, people had to go to your office, stand on a line, and present 
their demands to you. Some congress-member feel threatened by the 
?????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. I came from a 
small town and when I was a child, you rarely saw a congress-member in the 
field. Today, everyone is there doing different things". (Jorge Duque, Colorado 
congress-member, interviewed by Luna, 2003). 
Additionally, partially deriving from the reduction of the available stock of goods for 
establishing non-programmatic linkages with constituents (but also resulting from the 
institutional incentives introduced in the 1996 Constitution), both traditional parties have 
witnessed a process of bi-fractionalization, which reinforces the reduction of the historically 
high levels of internal competition observed in both parties (Piñeiro 2004).  
"Even though I am herrerista, I know that the hegemony of Herrerismo has 
hurted the party. We have always been a party of many candidates, three, four, 
or even more. And last time, we came to the national election with only one 
candidate and after a primary that had left many injuries open. The Blancos do 
not like to vote like that. They like many candidates, the Blanco Independiente 
and the Herrerista are different. They like different candidates and those 
???????????????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???????????". (Juan Creceri, Blanco 
local activist, interviewed by Luna, 2003).  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
capacity to present a widely diversified electoral menu. This has seemingly translated into a 
greater incapacity to compete in the long-run.  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
further enabling the consolidation of Tabaré Vázquez political leadership.  
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The reform process and its aftermath yielded two additional negative externalities for 
traditional parties. On the one hand, if the reform were not approved in 1996, Frente Amplio 
would have probably arrived into presidential office in 1999. Accordingly, this party would 
have been in charge of governing the country during the most severe economic and social 
crisis that Uruguay had faced in history. Presumably, traditional parties would have 
eventually benefited from voter discontent with the left, strengthening their chance of 
resuming their historical leadership in 2004. Conversely, in 2004, they obtained their worst 
electoral result ever.  
On the other hand, within Frente Amplio, ?????????? confrontation with Seregni and 
Astori over the constitutional reform of 1996 triggered important degrees of internal turmoil. 
However, in the long-run, the internal conflict surrounding the constitutional reform debate 
was crucial in fostering Vázquez hegemony and moderation. While Vázquez opposed the 
reform, Seregni (still the President of FA) had personally negotiated the deal with Blanco and 
Colorado leaders and therefore supported the measure. Astori joined Seregni and both 
claimed that beyond short-term hindrances to the electoral chances of FA in 1999, the partial 
elimination of the DSV and the instauration of unique presidential candidacies coincided with 
the historical positions of FA. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ???????? ??th anniversary in February 1996 an?? ????????? ??????? ??? ????? ????? ????????
consolidated the internal power of the second within the party. Although the reform was 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????94 election) of the electorate.  
?????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??????? ???????? ????????? ???????? ???
adhere to an arrangement with the traditional parties consolidated his image as a harsh 
opposition leader. Internally, this granted Vázquez the support of radical groups that had since 
1990 aligned with Seregni and Astori, producing a crucial switch in the internal and external 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the traditional-family (Yaffé 2005). Thereafter, Vázquez received further compensations for 
his consistent opposition to neoliberal parties with the integration of the MPP to his internal 
coalition in 1999 and the results he obtained in the presidential primary defeating Astori by an 
uncontestable margin (82% vs. 18%). ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the polls, obtaining almost 50% fewer votes than the largest internal plurality obtained in the 
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1994 election (39% vs. 20%). Vázquez hegemony within FA turned out crucial in explaining 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
4. Conclusion: The paradox of the reforms of 1996  
In 1996 Uruguayan citizens approve a new constitution that changed several of the 
classic institutional features of the country since 1942. Interesting, these changes were 
processed in a certainly democratic environment and far away from any political, social or 
economic stressful situation, as seen in many other Latin American countries. The 
constitutional reform of 1996 is consistent with the long-term trajectory of the country.  
The reform introduced a crucial split in the general pattern of cooperation and 
competition between coalitional partners (the Blanco and Colorado party) yielding two 
distinct scenarios (from 1984 to 1995 and since 1996) that potentially introduce important 
discontinuities for the analysis of political competition in the country. In the 1994 election the 
leftist party (Frente Amplio) almost won the presidency. This fact marked a fundamental 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
both traditional parties. While before 1994, losing office meant that the other traditional party 
would win but without a majority, now the implications were far more drastic as both 
traditional parties would be left out of office. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2004) we will claim that this case illustrates a clear instance in which the instrumental and 
short-term orientation of reformers contradicted their long-term interests. Therefore, in 
Uruguay, reformers were short-sighted and unable to anticipate the long-term effects of some 
measures that were introduced jointly with the runoff system to successfully achieve their 
short-term objective (prevent FA to win the election of 1999). However, this case also 
illustrates the limitations that instrumental reformers face when they need to negotiate an 
incoherent reform package to accommodate the interest of a wide set of partisan actors and to 
make that package attractive to the citizenry. Finally, we also need to stress that the long-term 
outcomes of the reform (i.e. the result of the 2004 election) were not only a by-product of its 
long-term effects. Indeed, that outcome was also a consequence of a long-run electoral swing 
and facilitated by the occurrence of a very significant external shock: the financial collapse of 
the country in 2002. Although some of the external phenomena affecting the long-term 
  35  
 
effectiveness of the reform should have been predicted (i.e. the long-term pattern of electoral 
growth of the left), the depth of the economic crisis and its effects on partisan alignments 
when interacting with the externalities created by the Constitutional reform were not 
foreseeable.  
Given that any reform of the constitution must be approved by a majority of the 
electorate in Uruguay, the reform should not only be functional to the interest of both 
traditional parties, but should also seek to accommodate broader interest in order to generate a 
critical mass of partisan support for the reform. Moreover, facing the challenge of making the 
reform legitimate and worthy in the eyes of the citizenry, interest should be dressed with 
reasons. The reasons on which citizen support for the reform was requested derived from 
some of the anticipated consequences of the four amendments address above.  
Whereas our evidence shows that the first reason on which reform was advocated was 
unfunded (coalitional politics was further complicated after the reform was introduced), we 
claim that the second series of reasons ????? ??? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ?????
accurately predicted and promised. Precisely, the effects of the additional reforms introduced 
to accommodate the interests of a broad partisan coalition and to lower the prominence of the 
runoff system within the reform package, ended up producing more harm than good to 
traditional parties in the long-run. Especially the single presidential candidacies and the 
???????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ??????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????
institutionalization of a bi-polar pattern of political competition between the left and 
traditional parties which further complicated coalitional politics and made the latter 
increasingly unable to differentiate and renew their electoral offer.  
Uruguay excels in Latin America for having tried with an enormity of political 
institutions, most of them processed within a democratic context. The key actors for all these 
experiences have being political parties and one of their most outstanding features is the 
existence of strongly organized fractions that operate with great political autonomy inside them. 
The new rules of the game approved in 1996, while fostering more fragmented political 
configurations than those Uruguayan used to witness, did not give the government effective 
instruments which would serve to neutralize this fragmentation. The only arena in which the 
new rules could have some impact is in the legislative discipline of fractions and parties, a 
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phenomenon which, in any case, was present before the reform (Buquet, Chasquetti, and 
Moraes 1998).  
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Figure 5. Ballot paper for the 2004 national elections 
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